To create the shadow fleet that illegally transported Russian oil, Putin relied on aging tankers whose prices suddenly skyrocketed − among them were many former Greek-owned ships.
In November 2022, the Greek-owned tanker Aris completed its last oil delivery from Russia to Singapore. Two months later, on January 31, 2023, the ship transmitted its final signal in the Straits of Singapore, marking the end of nearly two decades of service.
On the same day, the Aris, built in 2005, was sold by the New York Stock Exchange-listed shipping company Tsakos Energy Navigation Limited (TEN), headed by Nikolas Tsakos, for $21 million. The buyer was Chatula Marine Ltd, based in the Marshall Islands.
Within three weeks of its legal sale, the Aris resurfaced under a new identity. Renamed Canis Power, it began sailing under the Cook Islands flag and was managed by Radiating World Shipping Services, based in the United Arab Emirates. It soon set sail for Europe, making a brief stop in Amsterdam before continuing on to the Russian port of Vysotsk.
In the summer of 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on the Canis Power for transporting Russian oil, circumventing Western bans and restrictions. Soon after, the tanker, once again, changed identity (N CERNA) and ownership. This time it passed into the ownership of Swissmarlo Ltd, based in India.
In December 2024, the European Union also imposed sanctions on the ship.
When a ship is sanctioned, it loses access to Western ports and services. Changing the name, flag, and ownership after sanctions are imposed is done to obscure traces of the ship’s past and confuse the authorities and those dealing with them (e.g. port authorities and insurance companies).
A recent report by the Ukrainian research institute Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) identified the Canis Power, along with 126 other former Greek-owned tankers, as part of the Russian shadow fleet. These were sold by their Greek owners legally to third countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and ended up – under their new owners, often after successive sales – transporting Russian oil in violation of Western sanctions.
The KSE database was the starting point for a cross-border investigation Shadow Fleet Secrets, initiated by Dutch investigative news outlet Follow the Money, in partnership with 40 journalists (Süddeutsche Zeitung, NDR, Source Material, De Tijd, DanWatch, OCCRP, IRPI, NRK) from nine countries, including Solomon and Inside Story from Greece. The investigation found that during 2022-2024, European and American shipowners sold at least 230 tankers, which were later part of the Russian shadow fleet.
Greek shipowners hold the lion’s share, having sold 127 of 230, which correspond to 55% of all sales under investigation worldwide.
The revenue of Greek shipping companies from these sales is estimated to a cumulative total of more than $3.7 billion, for a total of $6.3 billion.
According to the KSE, for a ship to be categorized as part of the shadow fleet, in addition to the obvious, namely transporting Russian oil/petroleum products, it must also:
In addition to KSE, Lloyd’s List, one of the most authoritative shipping publications worldwide, has developed its own criteria and methodology to decide whether a ship belongs to the global shadow fleet.
The methodology of Lloyd’s List takes into account more specific criteria, such as: the age of the ship must be 15 years or above; its ownership is unknown or its corporate structure is designed to hide the traces of the beneficial owner; a known company does not insure it; it operates exclusively in the oil trade which is subject to sanctions (Russian in this case) and it engages in various deceptive maritime practices, such as switching off the mandatory monitoring and communication system which is used to exchange data between vessels and base stations (AIS); it changes flags frequently and carries out oil transfers from tanker to tanker in the middle of the ocean (ship to ship – STS).
Lloyd’s List’s shadow fleet excludes ships owned by state entities, such as Russia’s Sovcomflot, as well as ships already under sanctions.
Inside Story and Solomon combined KSE data with Lloyd’s List and came up with a joint list of 100 shadow ships, which were previously Greek-owned. As part of the research, we examined these ships one by one.
Before we proceed to the analysis of the 100 previously Greek-owned ships, which according to two organizations (KSE and Lloyd’s List) became part of the Russian shadow fleet after their sale, we need to put some things in chronological order, which will help in understanding the issue and highlighting all its aspects.
December 5, 2022: Russian Oil Price Cap
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to a barrage of sanctions from the West. One of these is the so-called price cap. This is an international ceiling that sets the maximum price at which Russia can sell its oil. This was set at $60 per barrel.
The price cap was announced in September 2022 and came into effect on December 5 of the same year by the EU and the G7 countries (USA, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan), aiming to limit the Kremlin’s revenues for financing the war.
Also, in June 2022, the EU Council announced its sixth package of sanctions and banned, among other things, the purchase, import and transport of crude oil by sea from Russia to the EU. The restrictions on crude oil also came into effect on December 5, 2022.
December 5, 2022 – December 18, 2023: The “golden age” of the shadow fleet
The price cap, as diplomatic sources in Brussels admitted to Inside Story and Solomon, seems to have created a larger and more complex problem than the one it attempted to control.
Russia had already started to search for new customers before the price cap and bans on Russian oil imports into the EU came into effect. Countries outside the EU and the G7, such as China and India, are not required to comply with Western sanctions, so they can import and buy Russian oil at higher prices. The only thing missing was finding a new way to transport it, without the involvement of Western companies (shipping and insurance).
The solution came from the invisible hand of the market: companies began to spring up in third countries, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which created their own fleets by buying up used ships. S&P Global research reports that in 2022, 864 newly-established shipping companies were associated or related to Russia. According to Lloyd’s List , the UAE has played a leading role as a broker in the Russian oil trade since 2022, with newly-established shipping and technical management companies directly linked to more than 170 tankers carrying crude oil from Russia.
The UAE, however, is only one piece of the puzzle of ownership of the global shadow fleet, as similar companies have been established in India, Hong Kong, Liberia, Seychelles, Suriname, the Cayman Islands and Moldova, among others.S&P Global’s research estimated in 2024 that the Russian shadow fleet numbered 591 tankers, an increase of 33% compared to its previous calculations in March 2023. The figure exceeds 10% of the global tanker fleet.
December 19, 2023 – European ban on tanker sales
In December 2023, amid the escalating problem, the European Union decided to ban the sale of tankers to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies in Russia, or for use in Russia, unless authorized by an EU member state competent authority.
The latest update of the relevant European regulation included provisions aimed at ensuring transparency in the sale of tankers, especially second-hand ones, which could be used to avoid the ban on importing Russian crude oil or petroleum products into the EU, and circumvent the price cap.
The process is as follows:
Shipowners must apply due diligence procedures, essentially a thorough check of the prospective buyer of their ship. If this procedure reveals that the sale concerns any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, or for use in Russia, they must submit to the competent authorities of their country – in the case of Greek shipping companies, to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs – an application for a special permit.
This application is a prerequisite for the continuation of the transaction.
If the verification process does not indicate a Russian buyer, they must notify the competent authority of the identity of the seller and the buyer and, where applicable, the incorporation documents of both parties, including the shareholding structure and the composition of their administrative bodies; also, the tanker’s identification code (IMO) and its call sign.
The notification has retroactive effect. As stipulated by the European regulation, any sale or other transfer of ownership of tankers, whether in Russia or in third countries, that took place after December 5, 2022 (the date of imposition of the price cap) and before December 19, 2023 (the date of amendment of the regulation), had to be reported to the competent authorities no later than February 20, 2024.
What does European regulation mean?
According to Panayiotis Ioakimidis, Professor Emeritus of International and European Studies at the University of Athens and member of the ELIAMEP Advisory Committee, “a regulation does not need to be incorporated into national law. It enters into force immediately upon its publication in the Journal of the European Union. It is considered binding to the states and the legal and natural persons to whom it is addressed.”
“Those selling ships must disclose and demonstrate that they have checked that the ship will not [be] circumventing sanctions or the oil price cap,” EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan told Inside Story and Solomon.
“We are satisfied as this has created a situation where companies are entering the process of reflecting and saying: ‘here we need to be a little more careful’,” he added.
Based on the above, we divided the sales of the 100 Greek-owned ships, (which in the second or third year ended up in the Russian shadow fleet), into three categories:
As we will see, in this case the responsibility of the European seller/shipowner for the future course of the ship, once it leaves his hands, is essentially nullified by the fact that these ships change ownership a second, perhaps even a third time, before joining the shadow fleet.
How we calculate the value of transactions
To determine the price at which a ship was sold, weekly reports from 12 shipping brokerages were used. In cases where no record was available, or the sale price was not disclosed, the value of the ship at the time of sale was used. This information was taken from the VesselsValue data website.
From the Russian invasion in February until the price cap came into effect in December of the same year, a total of 23 Greek-owned ships were sold to the Russian shadow fleet. From these sales, Greek shipowners earned an estimated total of $575.5 million.
The three companies with the most relevant ship sales in 2022 were Thenamaris Ships Management (owned by Konstantinos and Nikolas Martinos) with four ships, United Maritime (owned by Stamatis Tsantanis) with two ships, and Estoril Navigation (owned by Alex Karidopoulos), with two ships. The remaining 15 ships were sold by 15 Greek-owned shipping companies.
It is noted that demand for used tankers, from Russia and the intermediary companies which were established overnight, had begun to increase at least since September 2022, when it was announced that a price cap would be imposed on the selling price of Russian oil.
Without this boost in demand, most used tankers would not have had significant resale value and some would likely have been scrapped. The war crisis created an opportunity in the shipping market and shipowners rushed to seize it. This move, in addition to being completely legal, is consistent with the profit-seeking nature of every company, not just shipping companies.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann, senior analyst at Lloyd’s List Intelligence, confirms that Russian demand for used tankers has increased prices internationally and pushed European companies to sell even more.
“If you have an old car that you don’t want and it’s worth $2,000, but someone comes to you and says, I’ll give you $4,000 for the car, then you’re not just going to sell them one, you’re going to sell them any car you can find,” she said. “That’s basically what happened with the shadow fleet.”
“Those who had old ships in Europe sold them and ended up doing Russian trade,” she explained. “It’s impossible not to know where this ship will end up. I can’t think of a sale of tankers older than 15 years that didn’t end up in Russian trade, and their prices were much higher than they were a year ago, before the invasion. So it was very, very obvious.”
A shipping broker, who asked to remain anonymous, said the whole issue is about the profits of the shipping companies. “An investor only cares about one thing, and that’s money. On an ethical level, the issue is borderline,” he added. “If they are allowed, they will do it.”
In 2023, after the price cap and before the introduction of restrictions and bans on tanker sales, sales of Greek-owned tankers that ended up in the Russian shadow fleet skyrocketed to 63 from 23 in 2022, earning Greek shipowners a total of $1.9 billion.
First in number of sales was Tsakos Energy Navigation (Nikolas Tsakos, owner) with 9 sales, estimated to have generated $182 million, and second was Avin International (Giorgios V. Vardinogiannis) with 5 ships sold for an estimated revenue of $136 million.
Prime Marine Management (S. Topouzoglou, M. Chalkias and G. Kouleris) also sold 5 ships, earning an estimated $111 million. The remaining 44 ships were sold by 30 Greek-owned shipping companies.
In June 2023, Atlas Maritime, owned by shipowner Leon Patitsas, together with European Maritime Finance, announced the sale of the Dakota Strength, which according to KSE and Lloyd’s List is now part of the Russian shadow fleet. According to shipping brokerage sources, the tanker was sold for almost $40 million.
The announcement of the sale of the vessel, which refers to the – much lower – purchase price a few years ago, is indicative. “We are excited to announce the sale of Dakota Strength, built in 2007. This investment will provide yet another successful return for our clients and continue to build our long-term reputation for achieving excellent returns to our investors. We are proud of our long-standing partnership with Atlas Maritime. We originally purchased the vessel in 2019 for $21.25 million,” stated Martin Haugaard, CEO of European Maritime Finance.
In 2024, after the introduction of bans on tanker sales and transfers, the numbers drop significantly. According to our analysis, only 14 former Greek-owned ships ended up in the Russian shadow fleet after being sold, through a labyrinthine route, for a total of $480 million. The top three sales in 2024 were TMS Tankers (George Economou) with five ships, Tsakos Energy Navigation with four and Thenamaris with two.
TMS Tankers did not respond to our request for comment.
The Tsakos Group, in its responses to Inside Story and Solomon, emphasized that: “Tsakos Energy Navigation Limited (TEN Ltd.) is a company listed on the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) and is supervised by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Therefore, in Sale & Purchase transactions – as in all its business transactions – TEN Ltd always complies with all applicable rules and procedures, as well as the sanctions regulations of the competent authorities.”
In a terse response, Thenamaris noted: “According to our corporate policy, we do not comment on business matters.”
None of the aforementioned companies have done anything illegal, nor has any omission occurred, confirms the Ministry of Maritime Affairs in its responses to Inside Story and Solomon: “To date, no case has been identified of a shipping company that has not fulfilled its obligation to notify the relevant sales or transfers and the required data. Furthermore, no documented case of non-compliance with the [provisions] has come to the attention of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs from any source.”
As part of our research, we addressed questions to 51 shipping companies that sold at least one of their ships at any time from February 2022 to December 2024. We received responses from 11 and all of the replies were along the same wavelength: that they conduct strict monitoring before each transaction and fully comply with all applicable rules and sanctions regulations.
The Ministry of Maritime Affairs clarifies that no one can blame the shipping companies that sold their used ships, after a thorough check of the prospective buyers, even if these ships ended up in the Russian shadow fleet, because these ships have changed hands more than once.
In detail, the Ministry noted: “The sale of ships by “Greek-owned” companies to third parties means, at least by presumption, that the selling companies are no longer involved in their operation. On the other hand, even if a ship that once belonged as an asset to a Greek company or flew the Greek or other European flag, is active in the future under its new ownership in the Russian oil trade in contravention of the EU sanctions regime, this does not entail the unfettered responsibility of the previous shipowner, as this concerns the implementation of due diligence procedures in connection with its possible future use. In the latter case, it is possible that other purchases and sales have occurred after the alienation of the ship from its old owner.”
The statistics shared with us by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs show that notifications of tanker sales/transfers for the period from December 19, 2023 to date (January 2025) amount to 200.
“Of these, 120 concern sales made before December 19, 2023 and the remaining 80 from that date until today.” The Ministry of Maritime Affairs also clarifies that to date it has not issued any special sales licenses for the transfer or sale of a ship to Russia, since no such application has been submitted.
Diplomatic sources in Brussels, referring to Greece, Cyprus and Malta, note that the three Mediterranean countries had warned that “the price cap would create a bigger problem than it was trying to solve and that, instead of controlling the flow of Russian oil through ships of European interests, we would create a monster that we would not be able to control. Neither economically nor environmentally nor in terms of insurance.”
On the other hand, the three countries are occasionally accused of placing a higher priority on defending the interests of their shipowners, rather than dealing a stronger blow to the Russian oil trade, with their objections to the tightening of sanctions at the European level.
For example, in 2023, the European Commission wanted to require shipowners to include in sales contracts a clause stating that the tanker being sold should never be used to transport Russian oil. The proposal, seen by Follow the Money, which is coordinating the research, did not receive the required unanimous support as Greece, Malta and Cyprus voted against it.
Our sources in Brussels, explaining the stance of the three countries, state that it was an ineffective measure anyway.
In response to the question we addressed to the European Commission, regarding whether there is a possibility of taking measures against shipowners who benefit from the sale of old ships to intermediary companies, which in the process become part of the Russian shadow fleet, a Commission spokesperson stated that “the upcoming sanctions package will include measures to this end. Of course, the final approval depends on the Council [of the European Union].”
The Ministry of Maritime Affairs, for its part, recognizes that the Russian shadow fleet “is indeed an existing problem that was created with the withdrawal of a large part of the quality fleets, as well as the Greek-owned fleet (which has consistently had over 30% of the world’s tanker capacity in recent years until today), from the transport of Russian oil.”
In their reply to Solomon and Inside Story, the Ministry also stated, “We should […] note that the sanctions in question drastically limit a country’s ability to trade with Western economic entities. At the same time, however, it does not constitute an absolute deterrent to developing a shadow fleet by finding ships in the global fleet and in third countries, where there is no obstacle to the purchase and sale of ships by/to any shipowner, without restrictions from sanctions regimes.”
To address the phenomenon, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs emphasizes, the attention of the international community should be focused on “the responsibility of the ship’s flag state (basically newly developed low-quality ship registries) that allow their operation in violation of the IMO maritime conventions on the safety of navigation, protection of the marine environment and the human resources employed by them.”
The Shadow Fleet Secrets is an ongoing investigative project by: Follow the Money, OCCRP, NDR, WDR, Süddeutsche Zeitung, De Tijd, IRPI, NRK, Danwatch, Source Material, Dialogue Earth, Solomon, Inside Story.
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